CTC TRENDS

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

No. 97-19 NOV 97



2QFY97 & 3QFY97

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
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CTC Trends for JRTC 2QFY97 & 3QFY97

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are <u>not</u> in any priority order.)

<u>Positive Performance</u>

TREND 1: Evaluate threat information. *Commanders at all levels are becoming more aware of the importance of conducting crater analysis* after the receipt of opposing forces (OPFOR) indirect fires. The information being provided in the shell report is being passed to the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis.

Techniques:

1. The information provided enables the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis of the enemy situation.
2. This analysis has increased the probability of the successful capture of several OPFOR mortars during the low intensity conflict (LIC) phase at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

(TA 5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 2: Analysis of the Battle Environment. S-2 sections and their supporting topographic teams *are preparing detailed terrain analysis products*.

Techniques:

1. When terrain analysis products are combined with good light and weather effects analysis and the consideration of the effects of the civilian populace on the current situation, the opportunities and challenges presented by friendly units on the JRTC battlefield are identified.
2. These same factors help define the enemy situation on the JRTC battlefield, and both are honed as a result of good home station training.

(TA 5.2.1.2 Collect Physical Environment Information)

TREND 3: Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) - Air Defense Artillery (ADA). Battery commanders are *conducting a thorough initial IPB with the brigade S-2*.

Techniques:

1. They identify the threat air order of battle, their mission, suspected air avenues of approach, and Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs).
2. They are becoming more adept at templating the locations of enemy air defense assets.
3. Battery commanders conduct analyses of how the enemy air supports the ground effort.
4. They have developed a greater understanding in correlating the distance factors of HLZs to battalion trains, and company trains has led to more effective templating of enemy HLZs.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 4: Analysis of threat doctrine and order of battle. S-2s understand the enemy's tactics and the capabilities of enemy systems and *transmit this information to units preparing for JRTC.*

Techniques:

1. Success at JRTC requires a thorough analysis training and preparation at home station.
2. Participation in JRTC's Leader Training Program (LTP) was a major factor in success and a key factor in pre-rotation training.
3. Individual soldiers often receive their understanding of probable enemy activities through a series of "JRTC Smart Books" produced by units preparing for their rotation. Successful units supplement these books with classes taught by the brigade S-2 shops.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Intelligence collection and analysis. The analysis control team (ACT) soldiers lack the basic skills necessary to provide the commander with consistent predictive analysis based on incoming Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) reports.

PROBLEM: The breakdown of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) into specific information requirements, serious incident reports (SIR), and dissemination of indicators; and reporting criteria for specific orders and requests (SOR) to deployed assets are two key weaknesses.

RESULTS:

1. Critical reports needed for the decision making process do not reach the S-2 in a timely manner and are often historical.
2. Critical information regarding enemy timelines, threat situation, and target composition/disposition are not consistently pushed down by the S-2s and the analysis and control team.
3. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to the Brigade S-2, but with little analysis.

Techniques:

1. The commander should review SIR and SOR as a part of his mission back briefs from subordinate leaders.
2. The military intelligence (MI) company team commander should require signal intelligence (SIGINT), traffic analysis (TA team), and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) analysts to produce a summary of activity every 12 hours.
3. Team leaders and above need to review FM 34-3 (*Intelligence Analysis*) to clearly understand their responsibilities concerning the breakdown of priority PIR into SIR/SOR and subsequent indicators.

(TA 5.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements)

TREND 2: Intelligence Collection Processing.

PROBLEMS:

1. Just as it is critical to integrate all task force elements, hospital and clinical staffs must not be left out.
2. Because of location and separation of function, information flow between hospital elements and the tactical operations center (TOC) is limited.

RESULTS:

1. Hospital staff who often obtain intelligence information from casualties cannot pass this information to the S-2.
2. Clinical personnel are not usually incorporated into operational planning and, therefore, cannot anticipate or forecast upcoming demands on the hospital system.

Techniques:

1. Commanders need to force integrate all staff and task force elements prior to deployment in order to develop a task force focus on arrival.
2. S-2s need to develop within the unit standard operating procedures (SOP) a system that allows for the reporting of information taken from casualties and the processing of that information.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 3: Analysis and Control Teams (ACT) Responsibilities.

PROBLEMS:

1. Individuals on the ACT are not sure of their responsibilities and duties.
2. Other soldiers in the headquarters and headquarters company HHC are not assisting in maintaining communications or battle tracking over a 24-hour period.

RESULTS:

1. Communications are not maintained for 24-hour periods.
2. Battle tracking is not thorough and complete.

Techniques:

1. Duty descriptions for each member of the Analysis and Control teams must be established and understood by each member.
2. An effort must be made to incorporate other non-96B soldiers with the HHC to assist with maintaining communications and battle tracking over 24-hour periods.
3. Sleep plans must be developed and enforced to allow for 24-hour operations.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 4: Synchronization of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW).

PROBLEMS:

1. The IEW scheme of maneuver is rarely planned and executed in such a way that it can adequately support brigade movement and future operations.
2. A breakdown of IEW coverage usually occurs as these assets prepare for follow-on operations.
3. Most team members do not know or understand the brigade's scheme of maneuver nor the commander's intent.
4. Ground surveillance system (GSS) missions are seldom synchronized to counter the brigade S-2's depicted stay-behind threat.

RESULTS:

1. Poor IEW coverage for the brigade movement.
2. Follow-on operations are usually not satisfactorily executed.
3. Most IEW soldiers feel isolated and not fully utilized as part of the operation.
4. Sensors are used primarily for local security.
5. Electronic attack (EA) missions are poorly planned and not thoroughly coordinated through the S-3/FSO.

Techniques:

1. Commanders must review the requirements for the IEW sync-matrix FM 34-2, chapter 2.
2. The ACT must review and disseminate the friendly and enemy situation prior to moving collection teams.
3. IEW coverage must be seamless, by bounding assets forward or by coordinating with higher to receive down link from QUICKFIX during information downtime.
4. Update the traffic analysis SOP with a "jamming checklist" which includes all the coordination and planning factors involved in executing electronic attack (EA) operations.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 5: Analysis Control Team (ACT).

PROBLEMS:

1. The ACT has difficulty executing all-source analysis in support of the brigade.
2. Soldiers are unsure of their role in the ACT and the function of their section of the TOC.
3. Shift changeovers are not conducted smoothly or with a focus toward the incoming shift.
4. Lack of an ACT "battle rhythm" hinders most sections from producing products the S-2 could use if presented in a timely manner.

RESULTS:

1. Predictive analysis is rarely attempted. SALUTE reports are generated and passed to brigade, but with little analysis.
2. Soldiers are completely unfamiliar with the all-source analysis system and its capabilities.
3. Junior analysts work well with the S-2, but do not routinely execute "reverse battlefield operating systems (BOS) IPB" with other members of the battle staff.

4. 24-hour operation suffers with proper sleep plan and staff brief associated with shift changeover. These staff changeovers disrupt "battle rhythm" necessary for battle tracking and tempo of operations.

Techniques:

1. Conduct weekly training with the ACE to increase soldier knowledge and future use of all-source analysis system (ASAS).
2. The ASAS can be used to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat database, upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, to name only a few uses.
3. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the area of operations (AO) but within the area of interest (AI) to familiarize him with the capabilities.
4. Integrate the ACT into the brigade TOC set-up preferably between the S-3 and S-2 and update the company SOP, clearly outlining the tasks of the ACT.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 6: Electronic Attack (EA).

PROBLEMS:

1. Electronic attack missions are poorly planned and not thoroughly coordinated through the S-3/FSO to weigh the effectiveness of jamming versus the importance of collection.
2. Units task their ground-based jammers but do not give them on/off time in accordance with the target synchronization matrix or an update template of enemy radio receivers.

RESULTS:

1. MI company team commanders are seldom able to inform the S-3/FSO of hour-by-hour collection capabilities of deployed assets.
2. Deployed IEW assets are usually either over tasked or under tasked.

Techniques:

1. The intelligence system can provide the answers to intelligence requirements in time to influence decisions. Read FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization*.
2. Commanders must review the requirements for IEW synch-matrix (FM 34-2, Chap. 2).
3. Target Analysis Teams must become familiar with EA operations in support of light infantry scheme of maneuver.
4. The TA SOP should be updated with a "jamming list" which includes all coordination and planning factors involved in executing EA operations.

(*TA 5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)*

TREND 7: Intelligence products.

PROBLEM:

Products that can help the brigade S-2 maintain and disseminate intelligence information, like the IEW incident map based on SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and signature intelligence MASINT analysis over a 12-hour period, are not available.

RESULT:

The S-2 is deprived of essential intelligence data needed to project enemy intentions and to provide the commander with information he needs in decision making.

Technique:

The analysts working at the ACT are the best source of analytical assistance for SIGINT and HUMINT databases; they are responsible in providing the most timely products to the S-2.

(TA 5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 8: Determine threat Courses of Action (COA).

PROBLEMS:

1. S-2s understand threat capabilities, doctrine, and effects of the battlefield but often do not translate this baseline knowledge into clear and complete depictions of enemy COAs.
2. Limited planning time always presents problems for S-2s.

RESULTS:

1. Commanders and their planning staffs are not being presented with timely situation templates (SITTEMP), descriptions of enemy COAs based on friendly plans, or listings of HVTs.
2. Some products prepared are incomplete.

Techniques:

1. Review Chapter 2 of FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, July 1994.
2. Successful S-2s operate under time constraints but focus on presenting the staff and commander with a complete SITTEMP as a minimum. The S-2 can reduce the other elements of a complete enemy COA to bullet notes or brief them.

(TA 5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

MANEUVER BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Enter and clear a room. Due to the training emphasis placed upon military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT) operations, most infantry teams and squads *are proficient at entering and clearing rooms*. Once inside a building of a MOUT site, units generally enjoy success, eliminating enemy resistance quickly and with a limited number of friendly losses.

Procedure: Refer to FM 7-8 where the basic room clearing procedures are described in detail and FM 32-9 where quick-fire procedures are described.

(TA 1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces -Units and Equipment)

TREND 2: Combined arms route clearance. Brigade staffs and maneuver commanders have demonstrated a *clear understanding of combined arms route clearance operations*. As a result, brigades have developed the proper task organization to address route clearance missions.

(TA 1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces - Units and Equipment)

TREND 3: Moving tactically. Units consistently *demonstrate the ability to move tactically during daylight conditions*. Soldiers use proper individual movement techniques under direct fire. Squads, platoons, and companies are adept at using proper movement techniques and formations based upon terrain and likelihood of enemy contact.

(TA 1.1.1.2.2 Move while Dismounted)

TREND 4: Use of Night Vision Devices (NVDs): Leaders and soldiers *are properly wearing NVDs on head/helmet harness and properly mounting night sights on weapon systems* during limited visibility operations. This greatly facilitates movement and security at night. Additionally, soldiers are using their AN/PAQ-4s in conjunction with their night vision devices (NVDs) during night engagements to assist in target acquisition.

Techniques:

1. Key leaders and selected individuals should wear NVDs during night movement.
2. Soldiers *not wearing NVDs* should use the off-center scanning technique during movement at night.
3. Begin wearing NVDs before end evening nautical twilight *(EENT)* to assist in the transition during twilight when it is too light to use NVDs but too dark to see without them.
4. Remember that it takes about two minutes to completely adapt to the dark after removal of the NVDs.
5. Using NVDs *inhibits the ability to hear, smell, and feel* because of the concentration required to use the NVDs effectively.
6. Integrate NVDs into sector sketches and coverage plans; plan for overlapping NVD coverage at night.
7. Ensure proper use of head/helmet harnesses; this prevents soldiers having to use their hands to hold NVDs during movement.
8. Do not wear PVS-7 flush against face with head harness; offset about 1/4 inch from face to retain peripheral vision at night.
9. Leaders must enforce AN/PAQ-4 discipline during night movements; AN/PAQ-4s *indiscriminately turned on* will *give away the unit's position* to a NVD-equipped enemy.

(TA 1.1.2 Negotiate Terrain)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Occupation.

PROBLEMS:

1. One of the most neglected areas during deployment is the occupation plan. Every unit will develop an Operations Order and all the plans and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) that relate to the operation, but many do not take the time to properly develop an occupation plan.

2. The occupation plan is critical since it is the first action on which many others are based. The actual occupation sets the tempo for the rest of the operation. An occupation that is on time will enable the unit to properly set and prepare for support operations.

RESULTS:

1. If the occupation is not organized, it will lead to massive confusion, thus resulting in a waste of time. It is not unusual to see units take 36 to 48 hours to finish the occupation.
2. Usually the longer an occupation takes, the more a unit becomes immersed in support operations, unable to effectively do either.

Techniques:

1. Develop an occupation plan and stick to it. Do not try to make drastic changes after the road march has begun; it is too late.
2. Ensure that every element is well versed on the plan.

(TA 1.1.1.4 Close into Tactical Position)

TREND 2: Scheme of maneuver for search and attack.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units are unable to execute the find, fix, and finish methodology against a quick hitting and elusive enemy.
2. Although most company commanders can provide a correct doctrinal definition of mutual support, few are able to translate the concept into the appropriate time/distance relationship between elements on the ground.
3. Platoons continually make contact with their nearest supporting element a kilometer or more away.

RESULTS:

1. Engagements tend to last seconds/minutes whereas the movements of supporting elements require minutes/hours to execute.
2. Most commanders employ either a linear scheme of maneuver with two or three platoons abreast or a decentralized independent platoon/squad search technique.
3. Once contact is made, both of these techniques rely on the rapid movement of supporting elements to converge on and fix the enemy.
4. Units find it difficult, if not impossible, to overcome the mobility factor: the enemy moves as fast or faster than you do.

Techniques:

1. The Decisive Point Technique, outlined in Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No 97-8, *Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,* executed at the company level applies the “hammer and anvil” approach. One platoon forms the fix (anvil) element by establishing ambushes along likely lines of drift into and out of the search zone. The remaining two platoons (hammer) search the zone, sweeping enemy forces toward the ambushes.

2. Refer to pp. II-9 to II-10; Field Manuals (FMs) 7-10, pp. 4-14 to 4-19; 7-20, pp. 3-18 to 3-23.

(TA 1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 3: Actions on contact.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units continue to perform poorly in the first moments of contact with enemy units.
2. General problems include an initial hesitation to react, failure to establish a base of fire sufficient to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to a flank, and failure to include indirect fire assets in the response.

RESULTS:

1. Many contacts result in several friendly casualties and an enemy who escapes unscathed.
2. Soldiers' execution of individual movement and marksmanship wins the day in the close fight.

Procedure: Review CALL *NTC Trends Compendium*, dated SEP 97, No. 97-17; refer to "Actions on Contact."

(TA 1.2 Engage Enemy)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Field Artillery Battalion S-2 involvement in the brigade targeting process. Field Artillery Battalion S-2s are increasingly *becoming involved in the brigade targeting process*, particularly in analyzing, identifying, and pinpointing OPFOR mortar locations and caches. The S-2s are attending brigade targeting meetings and are becoming an integral member of the brigade targeting effort**.**

(TA 2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 2: Determining critical fires. Commanders and their fire supporters are doing an excellent job of *determining when fires are critical*, where fires must be placed, and understanding the restrictions for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 3: Rear area fire support. Units have shown great improvement in *incorporating indirect fires in the brigade rear area*. Problems still exist, but we are moving in the right direction. Establishing a fire support cell in the fire support battalion (FSB) TOC from personnel in the FA battalion field trains and incorporating them in the brigade's fire support plan is extremely effective. The best use of a brigade support area (BSA) fire support officer (FSO) is in support of main support routes (MSRs) and the BSA when they are not in a battalion's sector. When the BSA is within a infantry battalion's sector, sufficient area around the BSA must be allocated to the FSB to control fires. (1 kilometer (km) is a good planning factor.)

(TA 2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 4: Commander/FSO integration. The *habitual relationship of commanders and fire support officers is working well*. Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Use of the Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (PLGR).

PROBLEM: During the LIC and deliberate attack, most forward observers (FOs) turn their PLGRs off or leave them in the continuous mode while moving.

RESULT: When the lead element of the platoon makes contact, the FO is unable to utilize the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that the PLGR is turned on and in the continuous mode.
2. Use it upon contact to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission utilizing the polar plot call for fire.
3. Implement the techniques described in "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," *Combat Training Center (CTC) Quarterly Bulletin*, 4th QTR, FY 96, No. 96-10, OCT 96.
4. Reference: TM 11-5825-29-13.

(TA 2.1 Process Ground Targets)

TREND 2: Company Fire Support Execution Matrix (FSEM).

PROBLEMS:

1. Most FSEMs used by the company FSOs are not standard.
2. Lack the sufficient detail to describe the fire support tasks to be executed without further guidance or explanation.

RESULT: FOs, company mortars, and other leaders within the company do not know what indirect fire support assets are available or how to employ what is available.

Techniques:

1. Standardize a FSEM format for all fire support teams (FIST) supporting a brigade.
2. References:
   -- Article #4, "Fire Support Products for the Company," JRTC FS DIV TTP, dtd 1 Oct 96.
   -- FM 6-20-20, p. 2-7.
   -- FM 6-20-50, p. 2-15.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 3: Utilization of Firepower Control Teams (FCTs). Many units come to JRTC with little or no knowledge of how to employ FCTs.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units do not train with the FCTs at home station. They train with them for the first time when they arrive at the intermediate staging base (ISB).
2. Most maneuver commanders do not adequately understand the employment capabilities of FCTs.

Techniques: Employ firepower control teams (FCTs) in one of two ways:

1. *Attach the FCT to a rifle company or a scout platoon* to provide responsive naval gun fires as well as a terminal close air support (CAS) control capability at the company or platoon level. This technique works well when there are limited fire support assets available (for example, during initial insertion or when operating forward of field artillery and/or mortar ranges).
2. *Treat the FCTs independently* during reconnaissance operations. Assign the FCT a named area of interest (NAI) or some other area in which to operate. This gives the maneuver commander more sets of eyes forward to cover more area. This forward employment requires detailed planning for communications, resupply, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and potential extraction/exfiltration of the FCTs when they operate independently and far and/or forward.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 4: Q36 operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Field artillery planners too often do not have an adequate understanding of the firefinder radar system to successfully plan and then execute using the system.
2. Too often the *targeting technician*, the firefinder subject matter expert, is not consulted about employment considerations beyond site selection until *after the battle has begun.*
3. Too many field artillery Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than the system can actually deliver.

RESULTS:

1. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to *execute unrealistic plans.*
2. The lack of planning and execution knowledge hampers unit planning for future operations.

Techniques:

1. Conduct extensive home station training with the system so that both operators and planners understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.
2. Conduct professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at home station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience.
3. At home station conduct Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system; i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and the terrain.
4. Make the *targeting technician* an integral member of the field artillery battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early.

(TA 2.1.2.1 Determine System Capabilities)

TREND 5: Call for fire procedures - forward observer (FO).

PROBLEM: Too many FOs initiate calls for fire using non-doctrinal, incomplete formats. EXAMPLE: calling in a grid location and nothing more.

RESULT: Critical loss of time as the firing unit must then request target size, description, and direction.

Techniques:

1. Fire support NCOs and officers must train FO teams in accordance with (IAW) FM 6-30, chapter 4.
2. All members of the battalion fire support element (FSE) must know the proper *call for fire format* and the *six elements required* to properly initiate a voice fire mission.
3. FIST training should include radio rehearsals and use of the training set forward observer (TSFO); emphasize proper calls for fire formats.
4. Ensure soldiers understand the necessity of providing the fire direction center with accurate and proper information the first time to increase mission processing times and ensure faster rounds on target.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 6: Howitzer range cards.

PROBLEMS:

1. Too many firing batteries either have no howitzer range card at all or only a partially completed one.
2. Frequently, howitzer range cards do not contain direct fire targets or data for antipersonnel ammunition (APERS) or Killer Junior.

Techniques:

1. Battery leadership should inspect howitzer range cards during pre-combat checks and inspections to ensure the range card is done to standard.
2. *Reinforce the value* of the direct fire range card for howitzer engagements.

3. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, Chap. 3, pp. 3-12.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 7: Out of traverse/6400 mil missions. Firing units often experience difficulty executing out of traverse missions.

PROBLEMS:

1. Executive officers (XOs) too often fail to derive the minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for each octant.
2. Fire direction centers (FDCs) often fail to compute terrain gun position corrections (TGPCs) for each octant.
3. Often howitzer section equipment, such as the prime mover and/or camouflage netting, prohibits true 6400 mil capability.
4. Howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly.
5. Lack of aiming reference points and pick-up displacement for all possible azimuths further inhibits crews from executing out of traverse/6400 mil missions.
6. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable using aiming posts to pick up displacement.
7. Units are not using distant aiming points (DAP) despite their availability.

RESULT: Slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter fire missions.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-40, FM 6-50, and the appropriate howitzer -10.
2. Ensure the XO and FDC understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out of traverse missions, especially setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6400 mils.
3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.
4. Frequently rehearse out of traverse dry fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.
5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate 6400 mil operations.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 8: Observer plans and use of triggers. Company FSOs are not developing observer plans and trigger points during defensive operations.

PROBLEM: Too many observers are unable to see the target area and do not establish or rehearse a trigger point.

RESULT: Planned fires normally impact after the target has passed through the target area, allowing an enemy element to successfully pass through the defensive sector.

Techniques:

1. Company FSOs must position observers in order to support the defense:

-- In restrictive terrain, place the FO well forward of the Company/Team (CO/TM) defensive position.

-- Establish an *identifiable* trigger point, based on a projected rate of enemy movement through the sector.

-- Rehearse the optimal position of the FO relative to the trigger once the enemy enters the target area.

2. Read FM 6-30, page 5-25, on the establishment and use of triggers.

(TA 2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 9: Mortar employment in close contact. Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

PROBLEMS:

1. Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are allowing their observers and FSOs to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy.
2. Company FSOs and Platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60 mm and 81 mm mortars along the unit's route.

Techniques:

1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route as they template enemy positions and likely ambush sites.
2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next target. *Use the minimum safe distance of the weapon system* designated to fire the target as the trigger or signal to shift to the new target.
3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy.
4. See "Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight" by LTC David L. Anderson in *CTC Quarterly Bulletin,* 96-4, 2d Quarter, FY 96, March 1996.

(TA 2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 10: Accuracy of mortars.

PROBLEMS:

1. FSOs are not providing timely meteorological (MET) data or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars.
2. Mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.

Techniques:

1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA Battalion S-3 to get meteorological (MET) messages (computer MET if the unit is using the Mortar Ballistic Computer) and survey support. Include the maneuver task force in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).

2. The FSO, with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units should register the mortars, and ensure this tasking is included in the operations order.

(TA 2.2.1.1 Conduct Surface Attack)

TREND 11: Indirect fires during small unit contacts. Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contacts.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a tendency to be overly cautious for fear of fratricide, since the enemy is often only 200-300 meters away.
2. Most fire support teams do not have an established battle drill for this situation. They are not well trained in the adjustment of fires onto rapidly moving mounted and dismounted enemy forces.
3. De-centralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the search and attack phase of operations.

RESULTS:

1. Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy.
2. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve the desired effects on the target.

Techniques:

1. Plan for and ***use*** artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.
2. Use priority targets for both the mortars and artillery. Selectively use quick fire channels to assist the observer in obtaining "fast, accurate" fire missions.
3. Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground upon contact. Once the round is on the ground, observers should be trained to make one bold, accurate shift and fire for effect.
4. Always give accurate target descriptions and make sure that the attack guidance is fully understood.
5. FIST training: include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the observer is moving.
6. Train FOs on rapidly determining a target location and initiating a complete call for fire while on the move *and under attack.*
7. Train FOs on the use of the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) to rapidly determine a target location in restrictive terrain. See "The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use to Bring Rapid, Accurate, Indirect Fires to the Close Fight," *CTC Quarterly Bulletin,* October 1996.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 12: LTACFIRE (light tactical fire direction system) Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Although rotational units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/initial fire support automation system (IFSAS) system.
2. Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction.

RESULTS:

1. The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.
2. Inexperienced operators, along with failure of the chain of command to force the use of the system, are the primary reasons. While units often have excellent LTACFIRE SOPs, they are rarely used.
3. Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.

Techniques:

1. To exploit the system, **both** operators and leaders must fully understand the capabilities of the system. Effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios, should be established and enforced to instill the necessary confidence to use the system.
2. Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all home station training events to ensure that this becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 13: Survey operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Survey support is not maximizing the use of all assets.
2. Initial Field Artillery Support Plans (FASP) has done a good job in directing survey support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control. Unfortunately, the trend is for survey support to cease after the firing batteries and radar are complete.

RESULT: Units exert minimum effort or consideration to assets in the task force; i.e., 81mm mortars, OH-58D, combat observation and laser team (COLTs) targets, routes, and obstacles.

Techniques:

1. Ensure planning in the survey annex in the Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP) encompasses all assets in the task force that require survey.
2. Review FM 6-2, specifically Chapters 14-2, 14-7, 15, and figure 15-1 (fire support coordination (FSCOORD) checklist).

3. Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at home station, focusing on the importance of effective survey.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 14: Integration of indirect fires into the maneuver plan.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units regularly develop the indirect fire plan separately from the maneuver plan.
2. The lack of initial coordination is compounded by the lack of an established and rapid method for clearing fires when units are in contact.

RESULTS:

1. These factors combine to result in missed opportunities and fratricides.
2. Inadequate fire support plans are frequently the product of the FSO's failure to effectively coordinate and integrate with the commander and staffs during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

Techniques:

1. Planning for fire support suffers, along with all other BOS planning, because of command and battle staff difficulties meeting all the requirements of the current military decision-making process (MDMP). Evidence points to the execution of the MDMP as the source of planning problems; because the staffs are so consumed by the process, they do not integrate or coordinate actions.
2. Fire support units should incorporate the techniques described in CALL Newsletter Update 95-12, *Military Decision Making Process: "Abbreviated Planning.*"

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

AIR DEFENSE BOS

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Early warning operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units have experienced difficulty maintaining consistent early warning.
2. Light and special divisions interim sensor (LSDIS) early warning radars have been improperly placed, resulting in the system not being maximized to its fullest capability.
3. Battery command posts have had difficulty maintaining communications on the division early warning net.

RESULT: Both problems have led to ADA elements assigned to the brigade being unsuccessful in interdicting enemy aircraft.

Techniques:

1. The brigade Air Defense Artillery Officer (ADAO) must ensure that he conducts a thorough IPB to identify enemy air avenues of approach and then conduct the necessary terrain analysis to determine the best position to place the LSDIS radar.

2. Communications must be maintained on the division early warning net in order to receive timely information specific to enemy air activity.

(TA 3.1 Process Air Targets)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Military Police (MP) protective services. MP units have been *effectively utilized to provide personnel security services* for brigade and battalion commanders. The use of these assets in this form allows the commanders the flexibility to conduct battlefield circulation. Additionally, the use of these assets prevents brigade staffs from utilizing maneuver battalion assets to serve in this capacity.

(TA 6.3.2.1.1.1 Employ Physical Security Measures)

TREND 2: Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). Recent observations indicate that *FARPs are improving in the area of force protection and supply management*. Camouflage is improving, and tankers are being dug in. Class III/V platoon sergeants and platoon leaders are becoming more involved in planning FARP operations such as site reconnaissance and amounts of fuel and ammo needed to accomplish the mission.

(TA 6.3.2.2.1 Employ Camouflage)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Conduct of route clearance operations. Maneuver commanders at all levels have demonstrated a lack of tactical patience and have pressured engineers into quickly conducting route sweep operations.

PROBLEM: Task force commanders do not conduct deliberate risk analysis do not determine the appropriate clearance method.

RESULT: This frequently results in minefields being discovered by the destruction of lead vehicles in the route clearance team.

Technique: Commanders must exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow engineer leaders to analyze the situation to determine the proper method to facilitate route clearance.

(TA 6.1.1 Overcome Obstacles)

TREND 2: Combined arms obstacle integration. Maneuver staffs and their engineers lack understanding of the integration of natural and reinforcing obstacles with fires to shape the enemy maneuver.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigades designate belts and intents but do not resource belts with appropriate quantities of class (CL) IV/V.
2. Brigades do not designate directed obstacle groups to support either the brigade deep fight or the brigade decisive point.
3. The brigade does not refine the obstacle plan by preparing consolidated obstacle graphics from task force obstacle plans and resolving any conflicts in intents (similar to the artillery fire support planning process).
4. Direct and indirect fires are seldom integrated with the obstacle plan at any level.

RESULT: Most of the defensive obstacle emplacement time is consumed by staffs conducting planning.

Techniques:

1. Plan and execute obstacle integration principles in accordance with FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.*
2. Obstacle belts and groups are planned and designated in order to synchronize the brigade and battalion defensive fight and researched to allow timely acquisition, allocation, and distribution of CL IV/V.

(TA 6.2.1 Secure/Select Location of Obstacles)

TREND 3: Enemy obstacle reporting and lane marking. Brigades have placed little emphasis on route status and obstacle tracking by maneuver commanders.

PROBLEM: Enemy obstacle reporting is poorly managed at all levels.

RESULT: Information pertaining to route and obstacle locations is not disseminated down to subordinate units throughout the brigade.

Techniques:

1. Brigades must ensure that reporting procedures, specific to route and obstacle locations, are developed and incorporated into existing SOPs.
2. Information received, referencing obstacle and route status, must be disseminated down to all subordinate units.

(TA 6.2.3 Mark Obstacles)

TREND 4: Positioning of crew served weapons. Artillery batteries and platoons

PROBLEMS:

1. Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of positioning crew served weapons.
2. Position restricts movement and operation.
3. Too often the crew served positions lack interlocking fires.
4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.
5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about *dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.*
6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.
7. Too many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions.
8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew served weapons proficiency.

RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references: FM 6-50, chap. 3, and STP 6-13B14-SM-TG, pg. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, positioning crew served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
3. Consider identifying crew served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
4. Crew served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.

(TA 6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)

TREND 5: Force protection. Protecting the force is every leader's concern and essential to sustaining the force.

PROBLEMS:

1. Individual and crew served weapon positions are not completed to standard, often lacking overhead cover.
2. The use of obstacles is non-existent.
3. Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment is seldom to standard.

RESULT: The continual improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.

Techniques:

1. All leaders and soldiers should review FM 7-8 and FM 5-103 for techniques and standards for defensive measures.

2. FM 20-3 gives company level leaders an understanding of camouflage principles.
3. An assembly area plan must be developed and continually improved upon.
4. Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.
5. Leaders must ensure force protection is a priority and the aviation task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 6: Damaged aircraft repair and recovery team procedures. Units habitually arrive with no battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) kits, manuals, or trained personnel. Units also tend to combine search and rescue (SAR) and disabled aircraft repair/recovery team (DARRT).

Technique: Unit leaders should be familiar with FM 1-513, FM 1-500, FM 20-30, and the joint publication on search and rescue.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 7: Base defense. Base defense for combat service support (CSS) units is what service support is for combat arms units. They know what it is but do not do it very well.

PROBLEMS:

1. Base defense is the painful process by which soldiers can increase their chances of surviving. Even so it is neglected.
2. The CSS soldier has to provide support while at the same time work on base defense. These actions compete for the same resource--in this instance, the soldier. It requires a careful balance, and normally support gets more attention at the expense of base defense.
3. CSS commanders need to realize that a good solid base defense is a force multiplier. Initially, base defense is going to require lots of manpower, but after the set has been completed, it will take less soldiers to maintain.

RESULT: Solid base defense will help CSS soldiers survive, thus increasing, if not sustaining, effective and efficient support to the customers.

Techniques:

1. Base defense must be factored into the service support equation.
2. CSS units must have a plan and aggressively execute it shortly after occupation prior to getting totally immersed in providing support.
3. NCOs as the doers must ensure maximum use of available time prior to getting involved in mission support.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 8: Emphasis on nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) Operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Recent observations tend to support a lack of emphasis on NBC operations at the brigade task force level.

2. Subordinate units consistently have performed poorly during the execution of both collective and individual level NBC-related tasks.

RESULT: Brigade staffs generally do not pay particular attention to NBC input until forced to go into mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear.

Techniques:

1. Brigades must place more emphasis on NBC operations and better incorporate the BOS into mission planning.
2. Attention needs to be paid to collective and individual level NBC training at home station.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 9: Force protection Forward Support Battalion (FSB). Forward Support Battalion Commanders typically define force protection in terms of base security measures.

PROBLEM: Force protection is often measured quantitatively and not qualitatively. Successful force protection is often defined in terms of the number of pickets pounded, the amount of wire strung, and the number of crew served weapons employed.

RESULT: This narrow definition of force protection does not include the integration and synchronization of all the BOS into an overall force protection plan.

Techniques:

1. Force protection includes: the construction of patient bunkers to protect wounded soldiers from indirect fire; the initiation of field sanitation and preventive medicine measures to protect soldiers from becoming casualties from non-battle diseases/injuries; and the integration of an intelligence collection plan for convoy operations in order to protect soldiers from driving/walking into minefields.
2. Force protection is a thought process that must become culture--a way of life--for a unit.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 10: Reconnaissance & security.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units fail to protect the force through aggressive reconnaissance and security patrolling during defense preparation and patrol base activities.
2. Only a small percentage of the force, if any at all, is dedicated to security operations.
3. Very little analysis of the threat goes into where to position security elements. LP/OPs are normally positioned too close to the friendly trace to provide adequate early warning.

RESULT: Enemy stay-behind elements are able to establish overwatch of obstacles, fighting positions, and other high value targets with little fear of compromise.

Technique: Outlined in FM 7-10, pp. 5-12 to 5-14. The techniques must be applied and rigidly enforced. The FIRST PRIORITY of work.

(TA 6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Aircraft maintenance and operational readiness. The aircraft readiness rate is being *maintained well above 90 percent* during rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Soldiers display exceptional knowledge in military occupational speciality (MOS) skills and are extremely proficient in aircraft repairs. Aviation unit-level maintenance (AVUM) aircraft maintenance practices and procedures are doctrinally sound. AVUM production controllers are proactive in their attempts to report aircraft status to the task force commander.

(TA 7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2: Casualty evacuation at company level. *CASEVAC at the company level continues to be a strength* and shows the impact of home station training. Platoons and companies normally do an excellent job treating and evacuating casualties as far as the company casualty collection points (CCP). They are also well versed in requesting aerial MEDEVAC aircraft and establishing HLZs for extraction.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 3: Casualty collection and evacuation. Units generally arrive at the JRTC with *well established and rehearsed casualty collection plans*. Casualties are usually collected at the company level very quickly after injury, with the majority of soldiers receiving initial treatment within the first hour. Most units have established radio procedures that streamline the evacuation request, and many units have an established "C-in-C casevac" who manages casualty evacuation assets. Additional successful techniques include the aggressive use of non-standard casualty evacuation vehicles and the forward positioning of medical personnel. The overall effect has been a general decrease in the number of soldiers who die of their wounds.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 4: Aerial resupply. Units that were successful *conducted aerial resupply planning early and then continually made adjustments* as the situation or tactical plan changed. Specific planning considerations were made to drop zone (DZ) locations and management of sling assets. Units have improved at conducting pre-combat inspections (PCIs) which has resulted in drop zones being set up with the proper equipment and sling load equipment being at the right location on the battlefield.

(TA 7.5.1.2.2 Move by Air)

TREND 5: Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) control. *Brigades have effectively employed MP units in the role of EPW control.* The use of these assets in this role has enhanced the ability of brigades to reduce the threat of terrorist actions against units and facilitated force protection.

(TA 7.7 Provide Military Police Support)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Medical Staff checking on supplies.

PROBLEM: Medical supplies often reach critical stockage levels because clinical staff and medical supply personnel fail to coordinate efforts.

RESULT: Medical supplies are used up and a several day lag time results for operational input which is often impossible to make up.

Techniques:

1. Medical staff personnel need to circulate through wards to check on supply levels, and clinical personnel need to gain a better understanding of the time necessary to obtain supplies through the normal requisitioning system.
2. Commanders need to educate both clinical and administrative personnel regarding the impact of their operations on the entire hospital system.

(TA 7.3.1 Distribute)

TREND 2: LOGPAC (logistical package) operations.

PROBLEM: Units are still experiencing difficulties with LOGPAC operations.

RESULT: Infantry battalion logistical planners are not planning 24, 48, and 72 hours out. For success, they must synchronize their LOGPACS with the battalion's tactical operations.

Techniques:

1. Battle track in the field and combat trains to stay abreast of friendly and enemy unit locations and ongoing operations being conducted by their battalions.
2. Support platoon leaders must utilize the Forward Support Battalion S-2 and their own battalion S-2 to track the enemy threat, specifically minefield locations.

(TA 7.3.1 Distribute)

TREND 3: Casualty evacuation in Combat Service Support (CSS) units.

PROBLEMS:

1. Many CSS units do not have a plan to evacuate casualties.
2. The large majority view casualty evacuation as a simple process that can be developed and executed while casualties are happening.

3. Even when units do have a plan, it has not been rehearsed and during execution proves to be ineffective. When the plan works, it usually cannot accommodate the continuous influx of casualties.

4. This is attributed to the dangerously low number of Combat Life Savers and medics available to help.

5. What units need to understand is that casualty evacuation is an event that will use resources normally used for other purposes.

RESULTS:

1. There are a high number of Died of Wounds (DOW) in these units.

2. Most do not analyze and fail to realize what it takes to properly render assistance and effectively remove their casualties from the battlefield.

3. Even the best evac plans cannot account for the massive number of casualties.

4. Qualified medical help can maintain soldiers alive while the evac plan gets to them.

5. Transportation is one of the most critical commodities for CSS units and, as such, has to be managed. The use of those assets has to be factored into the overall plan so when the time comes those resources will be available.

Techniques:

1. Commanders need to emphasize casualty evacuation.

2. Casualty evacuation has to be part of the plan and rehearsed in order to be successful.

3. Proper resource allocation and enough first aid qualified personnel translates into higher readiness level.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 4: Patient evacuation. Expeditious loading and evacuation of casualties is the single most important element in reducing the number of DOW on the battlefield today.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units fail to recognize that medical personnel alone cannot accomplish this mission.

2. Units are failing to augment teams with non-medical personnel and/or failing to adequately train team members so that evacuation platforms can be rapidly loaded and/or unloaded.

RESULT: Use of non-standard means of evacuation is increasingly being employed; litter teams are still slowing the process of evacuation.

Techniques:

1. Commanders need to emphasize that patient evacuation is not a medical mission but rather a unit mission.

2. Medical personnel should be used to supervise litter teams, but their expertise is better put to use in treatment of casualties than in the actual carrying of litters.

3. All unit personnel should be trained in litter team techniques and rotating rosters established to have personnel on call for litter team duty.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 5: Preventive medicine. Field sanitation measures is still one of the most critical elements of combat operations**.**

PROBLEM: Units routinely fail to leave proper distances between latrines and food service facilities and fail to establish hand-washing facilities in an expeditious manner.

RESULT: Historically, battlefield losses to Disease Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI) significantly exceed those of injuries incurred in battle.

Technique: Field sanitation measures need to be enforced from day one of any operation.

(TA 7.4.4.3 Provide Preventive Medicine)

TREND 6: Health service logistics.

PROBLEMS:

1. In order for units to have accountability for tracking and requisitioning of supplies, use of the TAMMIS system is required for field operations.
2. Units lack the ability to use the TAMMIS system mainly because of a lack of use at home station.

RESULT: Medical supplies are short and resulting in a several day lag time for operational input which is often impossible to make up.

Techniques:

1. Commanders need to educate both clinical and administrative personnel regarding the impact of their operations on the entire hospital system.
2. A system whereby clinical nomenclature can be cross-referenced with logistical NSNs can help to integrate these elements and simplify the requisitioning process.

(TA 7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 7: Water production operations. Units need to focus on the integration of preventive medicine, security, and maintenance for their reverse osmosis purification unit (ROWPU) operations, thus providing the task force with safe, continuous water support.

PROBLEM: Pre-combat inspections (PCI), maintenance of equipment, or identification of potential sites for these activities are not properly conducted prior to units deploying.

Techniques:

1. Leaders must conduct inspections prior to deployment to ensure all equipment is in operating order and all basic issue items (BII), chemicals, and test equipment is on hand.
2. The FSB S-2 needs to conduct thorough IPB to identify raw water sites in the brigade sector. Obtain overhead imagery of the AO and conduct thorough reconnaissance.

(TA 7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 8: Civilians on the battlefield. Most units are unfamiliar/untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield.

PROBLEMS:

1. Too often units allow civilians free access to the position area.
2. Subordinate elements frequently call battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Battalions usually take an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with the civilians.

RESULTS:

1. Disruption of unit activities.
2. Friendly or neutral civilians are too often unnecessarily angered by procedures and the treatment they receive as a result of units trying to figure out the proper disposition.
3. Too free an access, however, allows neutral or anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C2 nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.).
4. Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.

Techniques:

1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians.
2. Develop clear, concise guidance on what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian as well as those civilians who do not appear on any list.
3. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians. Train and rehearse all soldiers on how to deal with civilians on the battlefield at home station.

(TA 7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Leader cross-talk and communications. *Regular and timely communications* between company commanders and members of the battalion staff *are critical to the successful synchronization of operations*. Units regularly use FM communications and established control measures to allow "on the fly" coordination between maneuver elements and staff.

(TA 4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2: Commander's role in staff planning. Military Intelligence (MI) company team commanders are extremely proactive participants in the staff planning process. *Considerable effort is made to integrate IEW assets early into the brigade plan.*

(TA 4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 3: Communications. Over the last several rotations, aviation task forces have improved significantly in their ability to communicate. This improvement is due to increased proficiency by the operators as well as the *outstanding maintenance performed and supervised by the commo sections.*

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 4: Use and understanding of MSE (mobile subscriber equipment). Brigades have been successful in using mobile subscriber equipment during their operations here at the training center. *MSE has been established early on and has been maintained throughout rotations*. The use of MSE has provided the brigade with redundant means of communications and has freed up command nets to control current operations.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 5: FM retrans capabilities. Brigades have *employed FM retrans systems effectively*. As a result, commanders and staffs have been able to C2 operations over extended distances. Keys to success in the use of FM retrans usage have been the integration of the brigade signal officer (BSO) during the MDMP, effective terrain analysis, and reconnaissance of retrans locations. Additionally, brigades have employed FM retrans assets forward early to validate divisions made during planning.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 6: Flexibility to configure communication assets for varying missions. Brigade signal elements have been *successful in utilizing numerous communications to support operations* here at the training center. Brigades have the flexibility to incorporate several different assets into their operations to facilitate C2. Assets used during operations include single channel tactical satellites (TAC-SAT), single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS), MSE, and digital nets.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 7: Mission analysis. Overall, brigade level organizations *have executed mission analysis to standard*. Integral to their success has been products and tools used to capture and communicate the results of the analysis. Additionally, staffs have been successful in utilizing assistant staff officers to gather general information; i.e., assets available, combat power, etc., while primary staff officers were attending division level operations orders.

(TA 4.2.1.1 Analyze Mission)

TREND 8: Firing battery movement order. The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed IAW with the XO's Handbook, *addressing specific and implied tasks.* Battery leaders brief movement routes, utilizing start points, check points and release points. When higher HQs do not issue start points, check points, and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own, facilitating movement command and control.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 9: Clearance of fires battle drill. Brigades have been *effective in utilizing clearance of fires battle drills.* Keys to success have been a thorough understanding of battle drills specified in tactical command post standing operating procedures (TACSOPs), and tactical operations center (TOCSOPS), and the integration of all BOS elements into the drill. Additionally, subordinate units at all levels have demonstrated proficiency in executing the drill to quickly clear fires.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 10: Time management. Time management has been a strength among brigade level units. *Specifically, time schedules have been established* early on and brigades have assigned a custodian, historically the XO, to strictly manage timelines inherent to planning processes. Additionally, timelines and schedules have been modified as necessary to adapt to changes IAW the given situation.

(TA 4.4.1 Prepare Plans or Orders)

TREND 11: Integration of smoke platoon assets. Brigades have *integrated smoke platoon operations well into maneuver planning.* Smoke platoon assets have contributed greatly to the success of both defensive and offensive operations. Specifically, the brigades have utilized smoke assets to supplement deception operations and during the employment of volcano mine systems.

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 12: Survivability. Careful management, planning and utilization of engineer resources, class IV planning, and *improved threat analysis and awareness* have contributed to improved survivability.

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 13: Heavy unit task organization. Brigades have *successfully task organized heavy units to achieve combined arms integration*. Specifically, heavy units are allocated combat multipliers, i.e., ADA and Engineer assets, to achieve success.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 14: Heavy unit utilization during defensive operations. Brigades have been *successful in integrating heavy assets into defensive operations*. Heavy forces have proven to be very effective during counter-reconnaissance operations and covering force operations. Additionally, when combined with attack aviation, success has been achieved in the destruction of enemy forces both forward in sector and in engagement areas.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN) capabilities.

PROBLEM: Brigades have experienced difficulty in using tactical local area network during operations at JRTC.

RESULT: Laptop computers have not had the required software and device drivers to access TACLAN.

Technique: Brigades need to acquire the appropriate software and supporting equipment in order to effectively utilize this system.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 2: Staff coordination.

PROBLEMS:

1. Staffs also fail to recognize the importance of marking the facility as a hospital element through the use of the Red Cross symbol, which can be seen from all avenues of approach to the facility.
2. This is required for them to be afforded protection under the Geneva Convention. Units often place a Red Cross on top of the facility, which only identifies them as a medical facility to aircraft.

RESULT: Visual recognition from the ground is also mandatory and can be accomplished through display of the Red Cross on ambulances or on the sides of tentage.

Technique: Commanders need to force integration of all staff and task force elements prior to deployment to have a task force focus upon arrival.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communication Information)

TREND 3: Coordination between the brigade FSO and BSO and BN FSO.

PROBLEM: Brigade fire support elements need to ensure that they are integrated into signal specific issues within the TOC. Specifically, FSEs at brigade level do not receive updates referencing frequency changes, TEK changeover, and SOI changes implemented by the BSO.

RESULT: The FSE experiences difficulty in executing their assigned mission.

Technique: The BSO must assume ownership of the FSE and ensure the FSE is aware of any changes inherent to signal operations in the brigade.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communication Information)

TREND 4: Knowledge of ground maneuver unit task organization and equipment.

PROBLEM: Air mission commanders and aircrews are not aware of the assets available in the light/airborne infantry companies and battalions and thus not aware of the assets available.

Technique: Aviation companies need to develop a better situational awareness of the units they are supporting. At home station, units should attempt to conduct cross training OPDs with their maneuver counterparts.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 5: Information management - Battalion Command Posts (Bn Cps).

PROBLEM: Battalion command posts have difficulty receiving, analyzing, and disseminating information.

RESULT: Battle staffs are unable to provide the information which the commander needs to see the battlefield (both the enemy and his own unit).

Techniques:

1. The commander can keep his staff focused by carefully developing and updating all three components of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR): priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR).
2. Develop a method to ensure that the three command posts (Main CP, Combat Trains CP, and Field Trains CP) receive and share critical battlefield information.

(TA 4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 6: Battle tracking and situational awareness. Air Defense units continue to suffer substantial casualties which are primarily caused by a lack of battle tracking and situational awareness.

PROBLEMS:

1. Inaccurate information concerning air defense team locations.
2. Actual team locations differ from those posted on the ADO's maps despite clearance of fires battle drills conducted at brigade and battalion level.
3. Current minefield tracking charts, usually available at brigade and battalion TOCs, are not considered when planning Stinger and Avenger moves.

RESULTS:

1. Fratricides caused by friendly indirect fire systems.
2. Stinger and Avenger teams suffer an inordinate amount of casualties from known friendly and enemy minefields.

Techniques:

1. ADOs at brigade and battalion level must ensure that their battle tracking is current and accurate.
2. Use communications procedures, status charts, and tracking tools effectively to keep the ADO situationally aware of the entire battlefield.
3. CALL Newsletter 95-7 (*Tactical Operations Center*) provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.
4. TF TOCs should establish a central node, similar to the one used during the fight, and track the preparation for combat and re-prioritize efforts (Battle Command-Seeing Ourselves).
5. Effective battle tracking begins with the establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis and the development of CCIR that must be tracked.

6. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions during home station and implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 7: Air Defense coordination. Brigade air defense has not been effectively coordinated.

PROBLEM:

1. ADA assets have not been positioned well, and coordination between brigade and battalion level assets has not facilitated integration.
2. ADA assets must be mutually supporting to ensure that early warning assets are positioned to acquire targets, communication systems are in place to receive information, and Avenger and Stinger systems are emplaced properly to interdict enemy aircraft.

Techniques: During the planning process, the ADAO must consider the above mentioned areas and develop plans for the employment of ADA assets to achieve success.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 8: Develop occupation plan. The Forward Support Battalion often fails to properly plan and execute the occupation/relocation of the BSA.

PROBLEMS:

1. The military decision making process (MDMP) is usually not used.
2. Operation is not synchronized with the brigade's current operations.
3. Rehearsals are seldom conducted. When they are, key personnel often fail to attend.
4. Normally the unit has an SOP for BSA occupation:
   -- Personnel not familiar with the SOP,
   -- do not follow the SOP.
   -- Never executed the procedure to verify whether it works or not.
5. FSB S-3s often consolidate the responsibilities of the security and quartering parties.
   -- OIC of the quartering party often inexperienced at placing units in the BSA.
   -- Lack the knowledge and experience of the area needed to properly disperse and defend the BSA.
6. Tenant elements in the BSA fail to submit sector sketches of their unit area and perimeter IAW unit SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The FSB S-3 normally plans the move in a vacuum with little or no input from the rest of the FSB staff and the tenant elements of the BSA.
2. Area improperly quartered when the main body arrives.
3. BSA TOC takes 48-72 hours after closure to establish a good sector sketch of the area.

Techniques:

1. The FSB should ensure compliance with unit SOP for BSA occupation.

2. Rely on the MDMP to:
-- Develop the plan.
-- Publish a good operations order.
-- Conduct a rehearsal of the operation.
-- Properly designate the responsibilities of the security party, quartering party, main body, and trail parties.
3. Doctrinal references:
-- FM 63-20, *Forward Support Battalion*
-- MTP 63-216, *Forward Support Battalion*
-- CGSC ST 101-5, *Command and Staff Decision Processes*

(TA 4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)

TREND 9: Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) - Aviation. Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision making process.

PROBLEMS:

1. The staffs do not have a clear understanding of the process and the linkage between the steps.
2. The few senior officers who understand the process generally focus on other issues.
3. Often the executive officer focuses on logistical issues, not ST 101-5 staff "leadership" requirements, while the S-3 is fighting the current fight. Units should train as a staff at home station to become proficient in all areas of the decision making process prior to their training rotation.

Techniques::

1. Use the executive officer as a *chief of staff* to coordinate the battle staff and oversee the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).
2. Use every available home station training opportunity to train as a staff in order to enhance proficiency in all areas of the decision making process.
3. Reference: ST 101-5.
4. Ensure that the unit TACSOP incorporates the procedures for battle staff drills.
5. References: See ST 101-5, CALL Newsletter 95-12, *Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning,"* and CALL Newsletter 95-7, *Tactical Operations Center,* for additional detail about techniques and procedures on how to successfully employ the decision making process.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 10: Targeting process/targeting meetings.

PROBLEMS:

1. Staff members do not understand their role in the targeting process.
2. Battle staffs lack collective experience using the targeting process.
3. Targeting meetings are random and often unfocused.

RESULT: Most units fail to prioritize and then focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high pay-off targets (HPTs).

Techniques:

1. Conducting the targeting meeting (in sequence):
   a. The brigade/battalion XO
      -- Opens the meeting.
      -- Details its purpose and the agenda.
      -- Specifies the time period or event being discussed in the meeting.
   b. The S-2 provides an intelligence update.
      (1) Briefs the current enemy situation.
      (2) Reviews the current collection plan and reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
      (3) Provides a battle damage assessment of targets engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy course of action.
      (4) Presents an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of actions and locations using the event template and a list of high value targets.
         -- for the next 24-36 hours for the brigade
         -- for the next 12-24 hours for battalion
      (5) Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the PIR for review by the battle staff.
   c. S-3 is next:
      (1) Briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to his intent.
      (2) Briefs any requirements from higher headquarters since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations.
      (3) Finally, he informs the battle staff of the status of assets available for the targeting process.
   d. The third briefer is the battalion FSO:
      (1) Briefs the status of all delivery assets.
         -- Reviews the current target synchronization matrix.
         -- Summarizes results of actions taken.
      (2) Provides the new target synchronization matrix and proposed list of HPTs and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement.
   e. Changes to the HPTL are made. Locations are updated or refined.
   f. XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix:
      -- Identify a detector.
      -- Determine an attack means.
      -- Assign an asset to assess each HPT.
   g. After the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the targeting meeting for approval.
   h. When the commander approves the results, the following products are updated, prepared, and reproduced for timely distribution:
      (1) Target Synchronization Matrix
      (2) FRAGO to subordinate units
      (3) Updated Target List
      (4) Updated R&S plan
      (5) Any changes to commander's PIR

2. Reference: Targeting Process video script in the JRTC FS DIV TTP Red Book, 1 OCT 96, p. 21.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 11: Utilization and integration. IEW assets are not properly tasked nor is their collection role clearly defined in support of the brigade scheme of maneuver.

PROBLEMS:

1. Reconnaissance & surveillance (R&S) plans at the battalion level and collection plans from the brigade do not clearly identify tasks (NAIs, reporting criteria, etc.) for most of the MI company's collection assets.
2. IEW teams task organized down to specific units routinely miss out on the mission analysis process, back briefs, and rehearsals which define the unit's scheme of maneuver and the role that IEW plays in the collection process.
3. Intelligence analysts (96Bs) within the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) are poorly utilized; most of their time is spent establishing and maintaining communications and tracking deployed assets.
4. The ACT is not integrated into the brigade TOC set-up and staff battle rhythm which prevents situational awareness.
5. The MI company team commander must sustain aggressive participation in the brigade's decision making process: this is the foundation for successful early integration of IEW assets on the battlefield.

Techniques:

1. Once the initial plan is set, the MI company commander must constantly check to ensure the plan is described in detail as part of the S-3's task organization, and tasks to subordinate units portion of the brigade OPORD, and subsequent FRAGOs.
2. The low density of MI resources and the independent and decentralized nature of IEW operations require that the company leadership exercise centralized planning and C2 for these assets to ensure the brigade commander's intent is met.
3. The MI company team commander must task collection assets in accordance with their capabilities and ensure that guidance published in the brigade collection and battalion R&S plans is carried out and tracked through the ACT.
4. If assets are misutilized by a supported unit, recommended task organization changes must be brought to the brigade S-3 during the target synchronization meeting.
5. The physical location of the ACT and set-up therein are subjects of much debate. Regardless of specifics, one item is certain: the ACT cannot function as a control and analysis hub for IEW operations unless it is fully integrated into the brigade TOC set-up. This clearly means being physically "attached" to the TOC, where on-shift soldiers can participate in TOC huddles, clearance of fire battle drills, targeting meetings, etc.
6. Several soldiers, such as the commo and NBC NCOICs, may be better utilized assisting with company headquarter's functions in the ACT. Any soldier, regardless of MOS, can be trained to properly maintain a journal, receive/send reports, and establish communications. All-source analysis, however, rests firmly on the shoulders of the 96Bs trained to do that job.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 12: Battle rhythm.

PROBLEM: Brigade level organizations have been ineffective in establishing a battle rhythm that maximizes planning time at the subordinate unit level.

RESULT: Commanders and subordinate leaders at all levels have not had the ideal planning time to plan for and execute orders and directives resulting from these processes.

Techniques:

1. Brigades must strive to conduct targeting meetings to direct operations for execution at company level 36 to 48 hours from the time orders and FRAGOs are issued.
2. Brigades must develop a battle rhythm using targeting meetings as the basis to develop the rhythm consistent with the time standards listed above.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 13: Integration of heavy Liaison Officers (LNOs) in the MDMP.

PROBLEM: Brigades have not effectively integrated heavy LNOs into the military decision making process (MDMP). As a result, the capabilities and limitations of heavy assets inherent to the brigade task force are not thoroughly understood.

RESULT: Normally, heavy units deploy to JRTC separate from light organizations and are not present during the initial planning process. Due to this fact, heavy integration becomes an afterthought.

Techniques:

1. Brigade staffs must ensure that heavy LNOs are incorporated into the MDMP and aggressively seek to integrate them into the process.
2. Heavy unit LNOs link up with supported units at the unit's home station and deploy with the brigade staff to JRTC.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 14: Heavy LNO packages.

PROBLEM: Heavy units deploy to the JRTC with only one LNO, resulting in a lack of sustained LNO operations in the TOC.

RESULT: This presents a problem when the one LNO is executing a rest plan and/or executing other duties specific to LNO responsibilities.

Technique: Supported units need to emphasize the importance of having more than one LNO to provide 24-hour LNO duties in the TOC.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 15: Task organizing Military Police (MP) units.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade staffs have habitually assigned MP platoons with missions that are executed in another unit's sector.
2. At times the platoons have been given TCPs and check points to man that are in close proximity to maneuver units in the same sector.

RESULT: Clearance of fires and direct fire control measures are difficult to manage, which has led to problems with fratricide.

Technique: Task organize MP units conducting these types of operations under maneuver battalions. This will alleviate the above mentioned problems.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 16: Casualty evacuation planning.

PROBLEM: Units are not getting the right personnel involved in the CHS planning and are not developing a plan to support sustained operations.

Techniques:

1. To develop a successful combat health support plan, the medical company commander, combat health support officer, brigade S-1, and brigade surgeon must all be involved in developing the plan.
2. During the brigade's course of action development, the combat health support (CHS) plan must be incorporated.
3. Units must use effective CHS rehearsals, matrices, and CHS cartoons on the concept of support.
4. Units can improve their evacuation process by using C-130s for the backhaul of routine and priority patients.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 17: Company-level estimate of the situation.

PROBLEMS:

1. Company/team commanders and platoon leaders make little or no effort to complete their own mission analysis with resultant products, including a timeline.
2. Lack of standardized operations order formats and presentation.
3. Inability to know when to use the deliberate, combat, or quick techniques when applying the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).
4. Poor time management.
5. Inadequate preparation to conduct MDMP planning in a field environment.

Techniques:

1. Reference: CALL Newsletter 95-12, *Tactical Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."*
2. Develop pre-printed, acetate sheets for conducting the estimate of the situation in the field:
   -- Mission analysis worksheet
   -- COA sketch sheets
   -- Blank timeline
   -- Warning order format
   -- FRAGO format
3. Company commanders can use their platoon leaders as a mini staff with each responsible for completing a portion of the mission analysis.
   -- Developing a COA
   -- Wargaming the COA
   -- Writing an annex to the FRAGO
4. Practice either the combat decision-making process or the quick decision-making process . ***Leaders must first understand how the entire formal process works before they can abbreviate the process; otherwise, steps in the process will be skipped and the plan will be poorly synchronized.***

(TA 4.3.1. Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 18: Guidance for fire support.

PROBLEM: The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague and does not focus on fire support assets.

RESULT: The guidance received is not supportable with the fire support assets available.

Techniques:

1. FM G-71, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,* pg. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOS. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. FM G-20-10 states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct and that we have the fire support assets available to achieve his attack guidance.
3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.

(TA 4.3.1. Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 19: Course of Action (COA) development.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigades have not thoroughly developed approved courses of action to the level of detail needed to execute wargamming and synchronization.

2. Brigades begin the MDMP already having an OPLAN developed to address their initial entry and mission. While this can serve as an advantage in the interest of time, staffs have not developed courses of action in detail.

RESULTS:

1. Movement tables, convoy density, and ACLs specific to airland and air assault operations are not developed until the actual wargamming and synchronization begin.

2. This confuses the wargamming process and does not allow the staff to totally focus on synchronizing the plan.

Techniques: Brigade staffs must develop approved courses of action prior to initiating the wargamming and synchronization process to maximize synchronization

(TA 4.3.2 Develop Courses of Action)

TREND 20: Maintenance standard operating procedures (SOPs).

PROBLEM: Maintenance units train at the JRTC without an updated maintenance SOP. The AVUM responsible for status reporting and maintenance flow management habitually will not have an SOP covering all the attached assets.

Techniques:

1. The unit should write, publish, and distribute a copy of the SOP outlining the maintenance procedures to be followed by the entire task force.

2. The SOP should contain such information as how attachments will report aircraft status, process oil samples, and conduct maintenance throughout the entire task force.

3. Refer to FM 1-500 for examples of tactical maintenance SOPs.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 21: Effective utilization of the battalion S-2 NCOIC.

PROBLEM: Battalion S-2s in infantry battalions do not effectively use their NCOICs. By MTOE, these battalions are authorized a CMF 11 series MSG as the S-2 NCOIC.

RESULT: This senior infantry NCO is a maneuver subject matter expert. In most cases, he has almost two decades of experience on how to fight at the team, squad, and platoon level.

Technique: S-2s should tap this experience when portraying how the enemy will fight small units, just as the S-2 taps the FSO's experience and expertise to determine how the enemy will deploy his indirect fire assets.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 22: Troop Leading Procedures (TLP).

PROBLEM: Units must revise company SOPs to include TLP checklists for all MI company assets. Ensure checklists are tailored to address missions such as initial deployment, planning and coordination, and movement (mounted/dismounted and air assault). Such checklists should include coordination as well as mission essential equipment items required for particular missions.

Technique: Commanders need to ensure that platoon and section leaders routinely participate in home station training with elements of their supported brigade task force to increase awareness of IEW assets and facilitate coordination during combat operations.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 23: Utilization of the Analysis Control Element (ACE).

PROBLEM: SALUTE reports are being passed to the commander with little or no analysis.

RESULTS: Where analysis is attempted, it is usually of poor quality and lacks the necessary detail to be useful to the commander. In essence, this information is only of general benefit to the commander.

Techniques:

1. Conduct weekly training with the ACE to increase soldier knowledge and future use of ASAS.
2. Use this tool to assist with radio line-of-sight (RLOS) planning, threat data base upkeep, and graphic intelligence summaries, to name only a few of its capabilities.
3. Incorporate communications and dissemination to the ACE as part of the ACT battle rhythm.
4. Utilize ACE-generated reports to update the brigade S-2 on developments outside the AO but within the area of interest (AI). The analysts working the ACE are the best source of analytical assistance for SIGINT and HUMINT databases.
5. Integrate the ACT into brigade TOC set-up, preferably between the S-3 and S-2.
6. Update the company SOP and clearly outline the tasks of the ACT.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 24: Transferring Command and Control (C2) from the Tactical Command Post (TAC) to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

PROBLEM:

1. Brigades do not have the procedures incorporated into the tactical standard operating procedures TACSOPs that address the specifics inherent to TOC vs TAC operations.
2. They have failed to develop any criteria that determines when the TAC has control of the battle.

Techniques:

1. Brigades must first determine what conditions must exist for this to occur. Examples are: all nets inherent to the TAC are operational and the TAC being in position to monitor and track the battle.

2. During wargamming and synchronization, brigade staffs must determine the necessity to employ a TAC. Considerations and factors include, but are not limited to, the need to place C2 at a specific point to influence the battle, the need to have redundant communications, and the current enemy threat.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 25: Rehearsals.

PROBLEMS:

1. Once units depart the Intermediate Staging Base, rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.

2. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in FM 7-20, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.

3. Rehearsal techniques listed in FM 6-20-1 are not being used.

Techniques:

1. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.

2. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires.

3. The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.

4. Review FM 6-20-1, pages 3-12 through 3-15. This source provides an excellent overview of key rehearsal elements. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by home station training, would greatly improve rehearsals.

(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans)

TREND 26: Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) - Military Intelligence (MI).

PROBLEMS:

1. The MI company leadership does not rigidly enforce the basic tenets of troop leading procedures (TLPs) during operations.

2. Rehearsals are not stressed by the company leadership, and little planning time is dedicated to contingency planning for C2, reporting criteria, and actions on contact.

RESULT:

1. The result is poorly planned missions which lack integration into the tactical scheme of maneuver.

2. The factors of METT-T are rarely considered, particularly in preparation for ground surveillance (GS) and human intelligence (HUMINT) team missions.

3. Teams often deploy missing basic mission essential equipment items such as radios, maps, etc.

4. Coordination with attached and/or supported units is poorly executed.

Techniques: Units must revise company SOPs to include TLP checklists for all MI company assets. Ensure checklists are tailored to address missions such as initial deployment, planning and coordination, and movement (mounted/dismounted and air assault). Such checklists should include coordination as well as mission essential equipment items required for particular missions.

(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Completet Plans and Orders)

TREND 27: Staff coordination. For a CSS unit, support operations drives the train.

PROBLEM:

1. The mission for CSS units is to provide support. However, support operations alone does not comprise the entire spectrum of elements needed to conduct or support combat operations.

2. A common mistake is to run support operations in a vacuum without the proper staff coordination.

RESULT: Missions come and go without the benefit of interrelating with other staff sections. Support operations sections do not coordinate with the S-3 or S-2.

Technique: The S-2 and S-3 can provide relevant information to elements going out on missions in support of customers.

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 28: Air/ground coordination and integration. Aviation and ground commanders fail to coordinate and integrate their assets to maximize the effectiveness of the combined arms team.

PROBLEMS:

1. Frequently, aviation units operate over the ground commander's sectors without understanding of the ground commander's intent or scheme of maneuver.

2. Ground commanders do not have a clear understanding of how to employ aviation assets.

3. Aviation commanders fail to give ground commanders an accurate depiction of aviation capabilities and limitations and fail to suggest the best method to utilize their assets.

Techniques:

1. Initiate commander/S-3 interface early in the planning cycle.

2. Commanders or S-3s should conduct direct coordination with aviation companies placed under the operational control of an infantry battalion.

3. During home station training, conduct classes on the Air Tasking Order (ATO), Airspace Control Order (ACO), Special Instructions (SPINS), and A2C2 operations IAW FM 100-103.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 29: Combat Health Support (CHS) Planning and Staff Integration.

PROBLEM: As the brigade's subject matter experts for combat health support operations, the Forward Support Medical Company Commander and the Brigade Surgeon are not properly integrated into the brigade staff.

RESULT: A CHS plan that lacks proper and timely coordination, synchronization, and dissemination. Overall, the CHS plan becomes reactive instead of proactive.

Techniques:

1. Integrate the Medical Company Commander and Brigade Surgeon into the brigade staff planning process for CHS operations.
2. Ensure that the Combat Health Support Officer (CHSO), the brigade signal officer, and a representative from the forward MEDEVAC support team become involved in the CHS planning process.
3. The brigade S-1 should schedule CHS wargaming, coordination meetings, and rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline.
4. The CHS planner must provide the command with a CHS estimate to be used as a basis for the CHS plan which is developed by the brigade S-1 and the other CHS planners in the brigade.
5. The CHS planners should develop a single CHS graphic (cartoon) showing the position of the brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes and planning, and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.
6. The brigade should include the CHS graphic with the brigade operations order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the CHS plan.
7. Doctrinal reference: FM 8-55.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 30: Commander's guidance for fire support. Most commanders are using the format of FM G-71 when writing their guidance for fire support using Purpose, Priority, Allocation, and Restriction (PPAR). Recently some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method, and Endstate.

PROBLEMS:

1. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.
2. Some FSOs use the terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass incorrectly.

RESULT: The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.

Techniques:

1. FM 6-71, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,* pg. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOS. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.

2. FM 6-20-10 states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct, and that we have the fire support assets available to achieve his attack guidance.

3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise and understandable terms.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 31: Heavy unit employment during MOUT.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade task forces have experienced difficulty in employing heavy teams during MOUT.

2. Heavy units do not understand the complexity of MOUT, and brigade staffs do not understand how to effectively utilize heavy units during MOUT.

3. Fire control measures needed to prevent fratricide have not been planned in detail.

Techniques:

1. Brigade staffs must conduct leader professional development training with heavy team leaders to completely understand how to employ heavy forces during MOUT.

2. Detailed planning to address fire control measures and issues must be incorporated into plans developed for MOUT.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 32: Task organizing Military Police (MP) units.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade staffs have habitually assigned MP platoons with missions that are executed in another unit's sector.

2. At times the platoons have been given TCPs and check points to man that are in close proximity of maneuver units in the same sector.

RESULT: Clearance of fires and direct fire control measure are difficult to manage, which has led to problems with fratricide.

Techniques: Task organize MP units conducting these types of operations under maneuver battalions.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 33: Synchronization of attacks.

PROBLEMS:

1. Synchronization of attacks in built-up areas.
2. Although units typically do well inside buildings, they are much less successful at coordinating the efforts of units outside and between buildings.
3. Units generally disregard the synchronization of direct fires, indirect fires, and obscuration, often in the belief that "MOUT is a squad leader's fight."
4. Units lack a detailed direct fire plan.
5. They fail to weight the main effort through restricting responsibility or adding combat power.
6. The unit's lack of a plan to suppress and obscure enemy positions to allow movement.
7. They exhibit tactical impatience, resulting in movement to a new building before the conditions have been set.

RESULTS:

1. The result is a large number of friendly casualties and the loss of tactical momentum.
2. On average, units suffer twice as many casualties moving between buildings as they do in the close fight within buildings.

Techniques:

1. Refer to *CALL CTC Bulletin 90-3,* "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)."
2. Refer to *CALL, Newsletter 93-8,* "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Chap II."

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)